The start of transition in the Balkans saw the exponential rise of NGOs. The public space previously reserved to several government created and supported organizations, such as of youth, women, or disabled, got filled with a myriad of groups pursuing a great diversity of causes ranging from relief, economic development, to democracy, human rights, anti-corruption, and a lot more.
|
|
Risto Karajkov
|
The context was that one of a challenge. The wars and the tasks of relief and reconstruction; democratization and the goals of opening democratic space and fighting authoritarian tendencies; economic and social transformation. One thing should be taken as given – there were many tasks in this complex process of multiple and turbulent transitions that were only done, and that could only be done by NGOs. Or NGOs, as the cliché goes, were uniquely positioned to address them. With all the criticism, a lot of it deserved, which goes around of NGOs, this should not be forgotten. In some cases these were things which governments wouldn’t tackle; in others, it was about confronting governments themselves.
The scope of this new civil society in the Balkans was never accurately measured in terms of numbers of groups, or, even more intricately, financial base and strength. It is very difficult (though not impossible) to assess the overall resources that produced the growth of the civil sector. In the 80s of the last century Lester Salamon, likely the foremost scholar on the nonprofit sector, using robust empirical data, gave a precise breakdown of the financial base of the third sector in the US, with an aim to show that its relationship with government is essentially one of partnership. Such an exercise in the Balkans would be quite a challenge, given the fact that civil society is a newborn and that data is chronically lacking.
One thing is beyond a doubt though – over 90% of the funding for NGOs in the Balkans came from foreign donors. Or in other words, there is a close and very clear link between foreign aid to the Balkans and the burgeoning world of civil society. Only for having a general idea, official development assistance (ODA) to the (Western) Balkans, in the period 1990-2005, not counting aid from private sources, was in the order of USD 40 billion. Realistically speaking, a small share of this (only nominal) amount went to local NGOs, but that is still substantial.
As for the numbers of NGOs, there is a clearer idea although; they are sometimes exaggerated because of groups which exist only on paper. The USAID NGO Sustainability Index for 2006 operates with a number of 7,000 registered local organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, of which around half are active. The number of registered groups in Kosovo is 3,800, with much smaller share being active, circa 150; for Macedonia, the Index reports a number of 6,000 registered groups of which estimated 5% (or 300) are active. Although these numbers are somewhat tentative ( it is unlikely that there are more active NGOs in Macedonia than in Kosovo), which only additionally confirms the data challenge, the USAID’s NGO Index remains the most relevant, cross –country, longitudinal survey of civil society in the region.
One thing is quite clear. The Balkans experienced a civil society explosion over the last 15 years. This explosion was supply driven. A lot of the foreign aid was distributed via NGOs. Sometimes because of ideology, such as that NGOs are the building blocks of democracy, and other times, for reasons of effectiveness – they easier to start up and operate, and control; or simply because of legal constraints in distribution of aid.
Was there really a need for so many NGOs? And what are the possible downsides of this third sector big bang?
Perhaps the major one is the disruption in the state – civil society balance. Too much state shrinks civic space; too much civil society can weaken institutions of government. After fifty years of too much state, the balance was somewhat unwillingly tipped in the other direction.
Even literally, the mandatory channeling of the funding through NGOs restricts the resources available directly to governments. New and fragile governments need the support as badly.
Nadia Diuk from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) recalls the democratic opening in Poland to make the point that donors are often constrained to deliver aid through private groups:
“Jacek Kuron [former Solidarnost frontline activist] who was then minister of labor asked that the assistance be channeled through government. He said the government needed to be strengthened. We could understand the argument but we couldn’t help”.
“Does Bosnia really need a few thousands of NGOs” asks Ray Jennings, a former USAID official in the Balkans. He points out that that the insistence on measuring the level of democracy and the health of civil society through the numbers of NGOs has lead to an artificial inflation of third sector groups.
Sometimes, the numbers do not aggregate quality.
“In Bosnia there are many NGOs but little civil society”, says Daniel Serwer, a Balkan expert from the US Institute of Peace (USIP).
Perhaps the most evident way in which NGOs drain potential resources away from government is by taking away skills and talent. Benefiting from international funding, NGO salaries are usually several times the national average. Nowhere is this more noticeable than in Bosnia and Kosovo.
“These countries are anomalies”, says another analyst, “the international community has substituted society, and anyone with any skill is either a driver or interpreter for the foreigners”.
Even if this view exaggerates in order to convey the point, and many skilled locals are in positions of responsibility in the NGO sector, the fact remains that civil society despite its ability to watch over government, cannot actually substitute it. Government also needs skill and talent
Another downside is that of fragmentation. The mainstream of short term project based assistance through NGOs has brought to many interventions being of one-off, limited duration, often overlapped and uncoordinated.
“We have balkanized assistance to the Balkans” lamented EU Commissioner Chris Patten over the entangled mash of assistance instruments to the region.
The role that a vibrant civic sector has in many facets of life in society is self-evident, be it in advocacy or service provision. Likely the years ahead in the region will further enhance the role of private organizations in delivery of services, which over the previous period were by and large responsibility of government.
Nevertheless, the third sector can not be a substitute for stable and healthy institutions of public administration. There are certain things that can only be done by the government.
|